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INTRODUCTION
Oceans have functioned for centuries as highways of maritime com-
merce and as fishing grounds. The economic role of oceans has lately
expanded to include nonrenewable resource extraction, in particular oil
and gas; oceans also support a vibrant tourist economy. More recently, a
number of other ocean uses have emerged, including bio-prospecting,
wave energy, tidal energy, offshore wind power development, and
marine aquaculture. Although some of these uses are still under develop-
ment, while others have to some degree been brought to fruition, all these
new uses share a common problem and raise a common concern-policy
regarding their use in U.S. waters is being formulated piecemeal, and
they are all developing economically in the absence of a coherent and
publicly-vetted policy framework. 2
At present in the United States, any attempt to develop the promise
of these new uses requires the government to spin together a hodgepodge
of laws enacted prior to the development of these technologies and appli-
cations without the benefit of having them in mind. Such a regulatory
void can be seen in attempts to regulate offshore aquaculture: an entre-
preneur must obtain a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps) per-
mit to place a structure in U.S. navigable waters, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) regulates the discharge of effluents from the
aquaculture facility, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-
istration (NOAA) asserts jurisdiction over aquaculture based on the pre-
mise that aquaculture operations may negatively impact wild fish
stocks,3 yet no agency has the authority to lease ocean space for the pur-
2 See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON ASSESSMENT OF TECH. AND OPPOR-
TUNITIES FOR MARINE AQUACULTURE IN THE U.S., MARINE BOARD, COMM'N ON ENG'G AND
TECHNICAL SYS., MARINE AQUACULTURE: OPPORTUNITIES FOR GROWTH 7 (National Academy
Press, 1992), available at http://search.nap.edu/books/0309046750/html.
3 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342 and 1343 (2002); Rivers and Harbors Act
(RHA), 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2002); Letter from James W. Brennan, Acting General Counsel,
NOAA to Robert Blumberg, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Re: American Norwegian Fish Farm, Inc. (1 February
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poses of aquaculture. 4 A similar hodgepodge exists for offshore wind
power. While public debate over offshore wind power and aquaculture is
likely to be centered on environmental and aesthetic issues, the govern-
ment's present offshore "framework" places both decisions in the hands
of the Army Corps of Engineers-a regulatory agency whose primary
foci are navigation and national security, thus mismatching public con-
cerns with regulatory priorities.
"Federal offshore waters" generally extend from 3 to 200 miles
from the shore. 5 The lack of a comprehensive planning and management
framework restricts the development of those waters,6 impeding ecosys-
tem management and presenting risk to ecological health7 as regulators,
developers, competing users of ocean space, and civil society try to navi-
gate the present regulatory maze. Indeed, the lack of a regulatory frame-
work prevents the airing and adequate consideration of competing
1993); attached memorandum from Jay S. Johnson, Deputy General Counsel and Margaret F.
Hayes, Assistant General Counsel for Fisheries to James W. Brennan, Regulation of Aquacul-
ture in the EEZ (1 February 1993). The EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) extends from 12 to
200 miles offshore.
4 In contrast, Congress, in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 et seq. (2000), vested the Minerals Management Service (MMS)-an agency within
the Department of the Interior-with authority to lease ocean space for the purposes of oil and
gas exploration.
5 Under the Submerged Lands Act (SLA), 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (2000), states have title to
the submerged lands extending three nautical miles from the low water mark and control over
natural resources within that three-mile belt (Florida's, on its Gulf coast, and Texas' ownership
and control extends 3 marine leagues, which is approximately 10 nautical miles). The United
States owns and controls the natural resources between three and two hundred miles from
shore, and its control over the continental shelf (the seabed) may extend even further. For
simplicity, we refer to such waters and the seabed as "federal offshore waters." See Proclama-
tion No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67-68, Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Re-
sources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf (September, 28, 1945) (asserting
U.S. jurisdiction and control over the continental shelf contiguous to the coasts of the United
States); Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,601 (March 11, 1983) (proclaiming an EEZ
that extends 200 miles offshore). For the federal government's present view of jurisdictional
boundaries, see Dep't of Homeland Security, Coast Guard, Territorial Seas, Navigable Waters,
and Jurisdiction, 68 Fed. Reg. 42,595-602 (July 18, 2003). See also United Nations Conven-
tion on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 21 I.L.M. 1261 (opened for signature, December 10, 1982,
in force, November 16, 1994) (specifying similar jurisdictional boundaries and indicating that
nations have sovereign rights to living and nonliving resources within their EEZ), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/convention-overview-convention.htm
(last updated Sept. 10, 2004). Although the U.S. has yet to ratify UNCLOS, maritime zones
are likely binding on the U.S. under customary international law.
6 Not only does the government lack a comprehensive plan, but there is not even a
sector-based regulatory framework for emerging uses for federal offshore waters.
7 U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY,
Final Report of the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy-Pre-Publication Copy, Washington,
D.C. (September 20, 2004), ISBN #0-9759462-0-X [hereinafter U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN
POLICY], p. 289, available at http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/wel-
come.html#prepub ("Enhanced coordination is also needed between federal and state aquacul-
ture policies and regulations to provide consistency to the industry and to adequately manage
potential impacts that cross jurisdictional lines, such as the spread of disease.").
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desires, namely those of potential developers of ocean space to gain ex-
clusive rights to particular ocean areas and the public's expectations as to
how publicly- and commonly-owned natural resources and the seascape
should be conserved and managed for the benefit of present and future
generations. Without a policy framework in place, new uses-even ones
that in the abstract hold as much popular appeal as offshore wind power
production-will lack full legitimacy and face difficulty negotiating a
variety of environmental, social, and political obstacles that are likely to
affect both their public perception and economic viability. 8
Given the potential promise of new uses (offshore wind power, for
example, can generate large amounts of "clean" non-greenhouse gas pro-
ducing energy) the present course is fraught with risk. After making the
not-so-bold assumption that some development of U.S. offshore waters is
inevitable and recognizing that emerging uses have the potential to raise
environmental, aesthetic, and other concerns, two questions come to the
fore: In which areas of the ocean should emerging uses develop? And
which regulatory framework will protect the public's interest in ocean
resources while at the same time providing developers with a viable
framework?
To examine these questions, we consider two emerging ocean uses:
offshore wind power turbine development (installed in groups sometimes
called "wind farms") and marine aquaculture (also known as maricul-
ture). We chose these as case studies because each has a near-term fu-
ture and each poses an interesting dilemma or decision trade-off for
policymakers and citizens. We assess the present regulatory framework
for offshore wind power and marine aquaculture, look to experiences in
other countries that have moved more quickly and aggressively than has
the United States to develop and regulate these new uses and to more
mature regulatory programs in the United States, particularly the onshore
wind right-of-way grant program and the offshore oil and gas leasing
program, to provide insight into the future of offshore wind and
aquaculture.
A. OFFSHORE AQUACULTURE (MARICULTURE)
Aquaculture has been increasing in most parts of the world and now
accounts for more than twenty-eight percent of the total global seafood
supply. 9 In North America, the marine aquaculture industry produced
8 Jeremy Firestone & Robert Barber, Fish as Pollutants: Limitations of and Crosscur-
rents in Law, Science, Management, and Policy, 78 WASH. L. REv. 693 (2003).
9 Sena S. De Silva, A Global Perspective of Aquaculture in the New Millennium, in
AQUACULTURE IN THE THIRD MILLENIUM: TECHNICAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON
AQUACULTURE IN THE THIRD MILLENIUM, BANGKOK, THAILAND, 20-25 FEBRUARY 2000, 431-
59 (R.P. Subasinghe et a]. eds., Bangkok: NACA and FAO: Rome, 2001), available at http:I/
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209,000 metric tons in 1997, an increase of more than 450 percent from
1988 levels 10 In addition to increasing the seafood supply, the marine
aquaculture industry has the potential to produce handsome revenues and
support numerous workers. For example, the finfish marine aquaculture
industry in Maine, which is "mostly [Atlantic] salmon, but alse trout,"'I
employs approximately 250 individuals and generates annual direct sales
and revenues of approximately $82 million. 12 Many view marine
aquaculture positively as a potential alternative to global fishery re-
sources, which are globally under stress as result of overfishing. How-
ever, it also raises concerns over pollution, disease transmission, genetic
contamination, the rearing of fish species such as Atlantic salmon that
require a diet composed in part of other fish species, and socio-economic
impacts (e.g., farmed Atlantic salmon competing with wild Alaskan
salmon). In the United States, almost all the efforts to develop marine
aquaculture have focused on state jurisdictional waters-those generally
within three miles of the shore.13
Perhaps as a result of conflicts among users of the ocean space,
concerns over escapes of aquaculture specimens, and near-shore environ-
mental impacts, fish farmers are beginning to look further offshore to
federal waters. In July 2003, a developer sought permission to conduct a
two-year study of the feasibility of culturing cobia, mahi-mahi, greater
amberjack, Florida pompano, red snapper, and cubera snapper thirty-
three miles off of the Florida coast. 14 Although NOAA/National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) ultimately denied the study request, 15 this in-
cident is significant in that it forced the government to consider marine
aquaculture in federal offshore waters for the first time.
B. OFFSHORE WIND POWER PRODUCTION
Wind power is the fastest growing source of energy in the world
today. In an era dominated by concern over climate change and uncer-
tain oil supplies, the growth of wind energy production should not be
surprising. But what has taken the country (or at least portions of it) by
www.fao.org/DOCREP/003/AB412E/ab412e27.htm. "Most parts" excludes Africa and the
countries of the former Soviet Union. Id.
10 FOOD AND AGRic. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS (FAO), Recent Trends and Possible
Consequences for World Fisheries and Aquaculture (Chapter 4), in STATE OF WORLD FISHER-
IES AND AQUACULTURE (SOFIA) (Rome: FAO, 2000), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/
003/x8002e/x8002e00.htm.
S1I Frank O'Hara et al., Economic Impact of Aquaculture in Maine, 2 (The Maine
Aquaculture Innovation Center 3, October 14, 2003).
12 Id.
13 See supra note 5.
14 68 Fed. Reg. 44745 (July 30, 2003).
15 68 Fed. Reg. 74217-18 (Dec. 23, 2003). The application was denied due to the appli-
cant's inexperience and its submission of false material as part of that application. Id.
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surprise, is the recent discovery that very large offshore wind resources
exist in close proximity to populated areas on the eastern seaboard. In
addition, turbines can now be manufactured on a larger scale with a
lower cost. This combination has led to a number of proposals for large
offshore wind projects along the Atlantic coast. When considering wind
power in the abstract, the public generally supports generating power
from wind energy. However, individual proposals for generating power
using offshore wind may face aesthetic and environmental objections.' 6
Indeed, Cape Wind Associates proposed to develop a wind farm off the
coast of Cape Cod, Massachusetts, which, if approved in its present
form, would consist of 130 wind turbines whose blades will extend more
than 400 feet above the sea and which will supply ten percent of the
entire State of Massachusetts' demand for electricity. This proposal has
been met with considerable opposition from local environmental organi-
zations, politicians, business interests, property owners, and fishing inter-
ests. 17 A dilemma is that, although offshore wind power facilities would
decrease U.S. dependence on fossil fuels and thus, may help alleviate sea
level rise and related coastal impacts brought about by climate change, in
the near term, offshore wind power development may impair the local
environment, fishing and other current operations, and the aesthetics of
the seascape. 18
Wind power also makes an interesting offshore case study because,
if the generated power will be consumed on land, cables transmitting that
power must run from the wind farm along the submerged lands, includ-
ing the submerged lands of the bordering state. While this generally
would not require a separate federal permitting process, as a given permit
16 William Kempton et al., The Offshore Wind Power Debate: Views from Cape Cod,
forthcoming 33(2) COASTAL MGrr. _ (March 2005).
17 Id. Thomas Arthur Utzinger, Federal Permitting Issues Related to Offshore Wind En-
ergy, Using the Cape Wind Project in Massachusetts as an Illustration, 34 ENVTL. L. REP.
10794-10807 (September 2004). Some portions of these communities support the project as
well. Id. Other active proposals to develop offshore wind power include efforts by the Long
Island Power Authority, available at http://www.lioffshorewindenergy.org (last visited June
15, 2004), and Bald Eagle Power Company (an offshore wind power project proposal off Long
Island that would convert wind power to hydrogen), available at http://www.baldeaglepower.
org/003.html (last visited June 15, 2004), and Winergy LLC, (proposing facilities at a number
of offshore locations), available at http://www.winergyllc.com/index.shtml (last visited June
15, 2004).
18 In an early legal skirmish over the Cape Cod development, the district court in Alli-
ance to Protect Nantucket Sound v. U.S. Department of the Army, 288 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D.
Mass. 2003), upheld the issuance of a permit by the Army Corps of Engineers to Cape Wind
Associates to construct a data tower to gather data relevant to the construction of the offshore
wind power facility. See also Ten Taxpayers Citizen Group v. Cape Wind Associates, Ltd.
Liability Corp., 278 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D. Mass. 2003) (dismissing the lawsuit and holding that
the federal government's grant of jurisdiction over portions of Nantucket Sound to the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts under 16 U.S.C. § 1856(a)(2) was limited to the regulation of
fishing activities).
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could cover both the wind towers and cables, it does enhance the state's
role in the regulatory process as compared to its role in aquaculture.
C. POTENTIAL CONNECTIONS AMONG OFFSHORE WIND POWER,
MARINE AQUACULTURE, AND OFFSHORE OIL
Several recent proposals suggest possible synergies between instal-
lation of offshore wind power, offshore aquaculture, and existing infra-
structure such as oil rigs. A recent study of aquaculture and offshore
wind farms in Germany suggests reducing user conflicts in the nearshore
zone by combining the two ocean uses. Interest in both aquaculture and
offshore wind farming has been growing in Germany, and engineers
have been successful in designing offshore wind structures that can with-
stand the harsh North Sea conditions. Although the technical capacity to
implement offshore aquaculture in Germany exists, the industry has
faced a number of constraints, namely (1) many conflicting interests
within the coastal zone, including tourism, shipping/boating, gravel min-
ing, military areas, fisheries, and marine protected areas; 19 (2) an absence
of a supportive legal framework;20 and (3) a harsh sea environment with
complex hydrodynamic conditions requiring specific engineering knowl-
edge; 2 ' and limited suitable ocean space. In Germany's case, teaming
aquaculture with offshore wind power would facilitate the implementa-
tion of both fledgling industries through reduced costs and infrastructure
requirements. 22
Additionally, Louisiana's Public Service Commission is currently
studying the feasibility of utilizing oil rigs set for decommission as plat-
forms for wind turbines. This would save oil companies money; over
1,000 oil rigs have been removed from the State's waters within the last
ten years, 23 and removal costs between $400,000 to $5 million, depend-
19 Bela Hieronymus Buck et al., Extensive Open Ocean Aquaculture Development
Within Wind Farms in Germany: The Prospect of Offshore Co-management and Legal Con-
straints, 47 OCEANS & COASTAL MGMT. 95, 97, 101, 111-112. See also Bela Hieronymus
Buck, Open Ocean Aquaculture und Offshore-Windparks: Eine Machbarkeitsstudie aber die
Multifunktionale Nutzung von Offshore-Windparks und Offshore-Marikultur im Raum Nord-
see, (abstract in English), Reports on Polar Research, Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and
Marine Research, Bremerhaven (2002), available at http://www.awi-bremerhaven.de/Publica-
tions/Buc2002a-abstract.html.
20 Buck et al., supra note 19, at 101.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Richard Burgess, Turbines May Offer Option for Oil Rigs, LAYFAYETTE DAILY AD-
VERTISER, December 29, 2003, available at http://www.theadvertiser.com/news/html/
192BCA47-3856-4019-ABE7-8957FD5F6FA5.shtml.
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ing on factors such as the depth of the water where the structure exists
and its size and location. 24
II. PRESENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK:
A PATCHWORK IN THE OCEANS
A. THE FEDERAL REGULATORY REGIME
Table 1 describes the principle federal laws that are potentially ap-
plicable to the regulation of offshore wind power and/or offshore
aquaculture. As set forth in Table 1,25 and as described in more detail
below, whenever a proposal is put forward to develop marine aquacul-
ture or wind power in federal offshore waters, the federal government
must sew together disparate threads of federal legislation due to the lack
of a coherent offshore policy. The U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy
recognizes that, as a result, "the nation runs the risk of unresolved con-
flicts, unnecessary delays, and uncertain procedures," 26 not to mention
confusion. Moreover, because a Congressional grant of authority to lease
ocean space is conspicuously absent from the framework, developers
lack security of legal tenure, while the public receives no compensation
for the use of public ocean space. We focus our primary attention on
permitting issues that arise in the existing regulatory scheme with less
attention devoted to consultation requirements, although we summarize
both in Table 1.
The inadequacy of this piecemeal regulatory regime perhaps is most
apparent when one considers that, at present, it is the Army Corps of
Engineers that is the lead agency, through a Rivers and Harbors Act
(RHA)27/Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)28 permit, Table 1,
item 1 (perhaps in conjunction with an Army Corps' dredge and fill per-
mit, Table 1, item 1 a, rather than an agency charged with managing and
24 Susan Langenhennig, Gulf Sanctuary: Should Oil Rigs Be Left in Place?, CYBER
DIVER NEWS NETWORK (June 29, 2003), available at http://www.cdnn.info/eco/e03070l/
e030701 .html.
25 Items la through 1k in Table 1 are labeled as such because certification, evaluation,
and consultation requirements contained therein will take place in conjunction with the Army
Corps of Engineers' review and consideration of an application under a Rivers and Harbors
Appropriations Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2001), permit application (Item 1).
26 U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 7, at 320.
27 33 U.S.C. § 403.
28 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1333 (extending the Army Corps'
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act jurisdiction to the outer continental shelf); see Alliance
to Protect Nantucket Sound, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 72-74 (regarding permit of an offshore wind
data tower and holding that the Army Corps of Engineers' jurisdiction extends to any structure
in the outer continental shelf that may impede navigation irrespective of whether the project is
intended to extract resources). See also Utzinger, supra note 17, at 10799-10803.
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conserving the ocean's biodiversity. 29 While it is true that the Army
Corps of Engineers makes its determinations based on what it perceives
to be the "public interest," its public interest standard is so infused with
competing considerations and value judgments as to give the Corps al-
most unbridled discretion. Indeed, the Corps states in its regulations that
it will consider "conservation, economics, aesthetics, general environ-
mental concerns, wetlands, historic properties, fish, and wildlife values,
flood hazards, floodplain values, land use, navigation, shore erosion and
accretion, recreation, water supply and conservation, water quality, en-
ergy needs, safety, food and fiber production, mineral needs, considera-
tions of property ownership, and, in general, the needs and welfare of the
people,' 30 not to mention the areas that the Army Corps of Engineers
holds most dear-navigation and national security-and that "how im-
portant a factor is and how much consideration it deserves will vary with
each proposal. '31 Moreover, given that concerns expressed regarding the
development of offshore wind power and marine aquaculture are likely
to involve environmental and aesthetic impacts that will be aired as part
of the environmental evaluation process, 32 having an agency whose focal
point and expertise are grounded in navigation results in a regulatory
mismatch. 33
The present hodgepodge of legislation and jurisdiction also creates
the potential for competition, when coordination is needed, among fed-
eral agencies such as the Army Corps of Engineers; the Minerals Man-
agement Service (MMS), which regulates offshore oil and gas and the
use of sand and gravel found on the outer continental shelf; the NOAA,
29 See generally Guy R. Martin & Odin A. Smith, The World's Largest Wind Energy
Facility in Nantucket Sound? Deficiencies in the Current Regulatory Process for Offshore
Wind Energy Development, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 285 (2004) (noting the imprecision
of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act and the Army Corps of Engineers' lack of exper-
tise in the areas of land use and energy policy).
30 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) (2003).
31 Id. § 320.4(a).
32 Kempton et al., supra note 16; Jeremy Firestone, Offshore Marine Aquaculture in U.S.
Federal Waters: Picking Up the Pieces and Painting a Picture, in AQUACULTURE LAW AND
POLICY: TOWARDS PRINCIPLED ACCESS AND OPERATIONS (D. VanderZwaag and G. Chao, eds.,
forthcoming 2004).
33 As the lead agency, the Army Corps would prepare an Environmental Assessment
(EA) or an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), as appropriate under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332. See infra Table 1, item lb. In Natural Res.
Def. Council v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, No. 01-07781 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2002), the court
held that despite the presumption against extraterritoriality, NEPA applies in the Exclusive
Economic Zone. For a discussion of the implications of NEPA for offshore wind power devel-
opment, see generally Dorothy W. Bisbee, NEPA Review of Offshore Wind Farms: Ensuring
Emission Reduction Benefits Outweigh Visual Impacts, 31 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L. REV. 349
(2004); see also Jay Wickersham, Sacred Landscapes and Profane Structures: How Offshore
Wind Power Challenges the Environmental Impact Review Process, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 325 (2004).
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which regulates ocean fisheries, marine mammals, marine sanctuaries,
and endangered ocean plants and animals, and oversees the coastal zone
management program; and the EPA, which regulates pollutant discharge
and ocean disposal (Table 1, items lc-lh). While each of these agencies,
along with others such as the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) and the
Coast Guard, would retain a role in an overall oceans regulatory frame-
work, or, alternatively, in sector-based regulatory regimes for wind and
marine aquaculture, respectively, considerations of project economics,
biodiversity impacts, ecosystem management, and precaution can most
readily be considered in a systematic, rational, and transparent manner
through the creation of just such a framework.
As noted above, a dredge-and-fill permit under the Clean Water Act
(CWA) 34 also may be needed (Table 1, item la). The decision to grant
such a permit would depend on whether or not the action occurred within
three miles of the shore, such as the cable running from a wind tower
through state waters to the shore, and whether or not the action is consid-
ered to be dredging or filling. Some methods of laying cable or sinking
wind towers (piles) would not trigger agency jurisdiction, although plac-
ing rip-rap around the pile base would. In the event such a permit was
needed, it presumably would be handled together with the RHA permit,
as the Army Corps of Engineers serves as the lead agency on both per-
mitting processes.
Several processes that arise out of the RHA permit bear particular
mention because they each raise interesting jurisdictional questions: his-
toric preservation consultation, state Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA) consistency certification, and state water quality certification
(Table 1, items li-lj). In addition to considering any effects to historic
or cultural resources on the seabed within state waters, the lead agency
also may need to engage in consultation regarding a project that, al-
though physically in federal waters, affects the view-shed of a historic
district.35 State consistency under the CZMA also is likely to play a role
in states that ban finfish marine aquaculture in state waters 36 and in most,
if not all, states in the wind power context, to the extent those states have
34 33 U.S.C. § 402 (2000).
35 This is more than a hypothetical consideration as just such a scenario may arise in the
context of the Cape Wind project proposal. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, NEW EN-
GLAND DISTRICT, CULTURAL RESOURCES / VISUAL ASSESSMENTS (November 2002) (discussing
the impact of the Nantucket offshore wind power project on the cultural resources of Nan-
tucket and the surrounding area) [hereinafter U.S. CORPS OF ENGINEERS].
36 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 16.40.210 (2003) ("A person may not grow or cultivate
finfish in captivity or under positive control for commercial purposes."); CAL. FISH & GAME
CODE § 15007 (2004) (prohibiting the spawning, incubation, or cultivation of any species of
finfish belonging to the family Salmonidae as well as of transgenic fish species and any exotic
species of finfish).
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plans that address the issue of energy facilities in state coastal zones. 37
Finally, state water quality certification is triggered for those projects
that take place within three miles of the shore. 38
A few additional federal authorities might participate in either wind
power or marine aquaculture developments or both. To begin with, both
the Coast Guard and the FAA require the marking and lighting of struc-
tures to aid aircraft and navigational vessels (Table 1, items 2 and 3).
While important from a view-shed or a safety standpoint, these require-
ments should in most instances be addressed to the satisfaction of all
concerned. For example, lighting's potential impact on views can be
considered when selecting the type of lighting fixture and the direction in
which the light will face.
Considerably more important and controversial is the regulation of
the discharge of pollutants under the Clean Water Act, particularly in the
aquaculture context. Unlike sections 401 (state water quality certifica-
tion) and 404 (dredge and fill permitting) of the CWA, which do not
apply beyond three miles of the shore, section 402 of the CWA, which
requires permits for the discharge of pollutants, applies by virtue of Sec-
tion 403 of the CWA (Table 1, item 4). Although the EPA has a long
history of issuing permits for offshore oil and gas facilities, it has not
been fully engaged in new offshore uses such as marine aquaculture.
However, two judicial opinions issued in 2002 suggest an enhanced EPA
role and explore some of the issues likely to have relevance at marine
aquaculture facilities.
First, a federal district court in Maine found that various materials
added by Atlantic salmon marine aquaculture operations to the waters of
the United States were "pollutants" within the meaning of the CWA. 39
Under the CWA, the term "pollutant" includes dredged spoils, solid
waste, chemical wastes, biological materials, and agricultural waste.40
Specifically, the court held that salmon feces and urine are "biological
materials" or "agricultural wastes"; uneaten pigments, antibiotics, a sub-
stance used to kill sea lice, and other substances that flow from the
marine aquaculture facility after their use are "chemical wastes"; materi-
als applied to nets constitute toxic pollutants; and Atlantic salmon not
37 See, e.g., MASSACHUSETTS OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT, MASSACHUSETrS
COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT PLAN (March 2002) ("encouraging ... the use of alternative
sources such as solar and wind power"). See also Rusty Russell, Neither Out Far nor in Deep:
The Prospects for Utility-Scale Wind Power in the Coastal Zone, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
221 (2004) (noting that individual state programs may not adequately account for the benefits
of offshore wind power, which are diffuse).
38 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 863 F.2d 1420, 1435 (9th Cir. 1988).
39 U.S. Pub. Interest Research Group v. Atlantic Salmon, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 239, 248
(D. Me. 2002). The court made similar findings involving different pollutants in two unpub-
lished companion cases.
40 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2001).
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native to North America that escape from their net pens are "biological
materials" within the meaning of the CWA.4 1 Because the facility opera-
tor did not have a CWA permit (which could in theory have authorized
the discharge of some or all of those pollutants), the court held that the
operator had violated the CWA. The second case, however, suggests that
not all marine aquaculture operations will be subject to CWA permit-
ting.42 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, al-
though mussel shells, feces, and other byproducts released into the
environment are not regulated by the CWA because they "come from the
natural growth and development of mussels" rather than from the "waste
product of a transformative human process."'43 Nevertheless, the court,
by reference to other cases, did imply that the escape of live fish from
marine aquaculture facilities is a regulated CWA discharge.44 In sum, at
least as to marine aquaculture, EPA regulation under Section 402 of the
CWA is likely to assume a more prominent role in offshore development.
Turning to one last area of federal regulation-to the extent an off-
shore wind power producer sells its power to a wholesaler such as a
public utility-the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) will
set rates governing the sale and transmission of the electricity generated
(Table 1, item 5). FERC, however, neither has jurisdiction over wind
power projects nor conducts environmental reviews as part of its rate
setting process, and is thus only tangentially involved in the core issues
considered here.45
B. STATE REQUIREMENTS
Finally, although a comprehensive analysis of state laws is beyond
the scope of the article, we do wish to draw some attention to the issue of
regulation pursuant to state law because various state laws could apply
even when marine aquaculture facilities or wind farms are located
outside state jurisdictional waters. For example, in the marine aquacul-
ture context, states may require a permit to transport live fish through
state jurisdictional waters. 46 States' roles are likely to be even more cen-
41 U.S. Pub. Interest Research Group, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 243-244, 247-248. For an
extended discussion of this case and an argument that marine aquaculture escapees, regardless
of origin, are "pollutants," see Firestone & Barber, supra note 8.
42 See Ass'n to Protect Hammersley v. Taylor Res., Inc., 299 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002).
For an extended discussion of this case, see Firestone & Barber, supra note 8.
43 Ass'n to Protect Hammersley, 299 F.3d at 1016-19 (limiting the statutory term "bio-
logical materials" in the Clean Water Act to "waste products of some human or industrial
process").
44 See id. at 1017 (citing Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 583
(6th Cir. 1998)).
45 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824 and 824d.
46 See 5 ALASKA ADMIN. CODE § 41.005 (1993); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 26-57
(1958).
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tral in the wind power context because in any instance where a developer
proposes to transmit electrical power generated at sea to land, the devel-
oper will also need approval from the state to place transmission cables
on the submerged lands that are under its jurisdiction. 47
No consolidated regulatory regime exists for either offshore wind
power or aquaculture; therefore, each proposal must be examined indi-
vidually to determine which state permits apply. Whether the state or
federal government has permitting jurisdiction, projects may be subject
to both local and state environmental policy acts. Generally, a developer
proposing a project in a given state's waters must meet the requirements
for permitting and licensing under that state's laws and regulations in
addition to any applicable federal requirements. 48 Moreover, even in
those instances in which a project is proposed to be placed in federal
waters, if it requires land support facilities or cables that would run
across state coastal waters or lands, that project also would be subject to
any applicable state laws. Although the federal consistency certification
process under the CZMA mentioned in the previous section occurs con-
currently with federal permitting review, having to obtain additional state
permits to complete projects necessitates a coordinated federal-state pro-
cess to avoid becoming unduly cumbersome and unnecessarily hindering
project development.
Development plans raising environmental questions often fall under
the jurisdiction of a state's environmental or natural resource agency.
Depending on the location and nature of the offshore wind or aquaculture
project at issue, developers would not only have to be concerned with a
state's coastal zone management plan, but would also have to address a
host of state licensing fees or permits, including wetlands permits, build-
ing permits, zoning ordinances, subaqueous permits, state National Pol-
lutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits for designated
states under the CWA, and any other applicable state regulations. In
Delaware, for example, projects entering state waters would likely be
subject not only to the state's CZMA consistency requirements,49 but
also would require a Delaware Subaqueous Lands Act permit50 and a
47 See U.S. CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 35.
48 See id.
49 See DIVISION OF SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION, DELAWARE COASTAL PROGRAMS
(describing Delaware's Coastal Management Program, which operates under the direction of
the Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control), available at http:/
/www.dnrec.state.de.us/DNREC2000/Divisions/Soil/dcmp/fedcon.htm.
50 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 7205 (1974) ("No person shall deposit material upon or
remove or extract materials from, or construct, modify, repair or reconstruct, or occupy any
structure or facility upon submerged lands or tidelands without first having obtained a permit,
lease, or letter of approval from the Department.").
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state wetlands permit, 51 among others. Other coastal states have similar
laws protecting the coastal environment.5 2 Virginia's Marine Resources
Commission, for example, issues subaqueous 53 and tidal wetlands per-
mits54 in accordance with Virginia's Wetlands and Subaqueous Laws.
Although many coastal states may have similar laws protecting the envi-
ronment, subtle differences in state code and permitting procedures could
add conflict, confusion, and inconsistency to the general process of siting
offshore projects.
III. ON-LAND WIND DEVELOPMENT AND REGULATION
IN THE UNITED STATES
Onshore wind energy plays an important, yet small, role in meeting
the United States' rising energy demands. As of January 2004, thirty
states were operating utility-scale wind energy projects for a total in-
stalled capacity of 6,374 megawatts (MW)-enough to supply over one
and a half million households. 55 Although this represents only about one
percent of total domestic electricity generation, it is estimated that U.S.
land-based wind resources are large enough to produce more than the
total U.S. electricity needs. 56
Typically, wind project developers are required to obtain permits
from one or more governmental agencies at the local, state or federal
level. The number of agencies involved and the level of jurisdiction de-
pend on a number of factors such as size of the wind farm, ownership of
the land, ownership of the project, and existing laws and regulations. 57
At the local level, regulation is often in the form of zoning ordinances or
building permit codes.58 For those projects permitted by a state, the lead
state agency typically coordinates review along with local authorities,
51 Id. § 6604(a) (1974) ("Any activity in the wetlands requires a permit from the Depart-
ment... and no permit may be granted unless the county or municipality having jurisdiction
has first approved the activity in question by zoning procedures provided by law.").
52 For a discussion of Massachusetts requirements for offshore wind power, see Christine
Santora et al., Managing Offshore Wind Developments in the United States: Legal, Environ-
mental and Social Considerations Using a Case Study in Nantucket Sound, Massachusetts, 47
OCEANS & COASTAL MGMT. 141 (2004).
53 VA. CODE ANN. § 28.2-1203 (1950).
54 Id. § 28.2-1306.
55 The land-based installed capacity generates approximately 16.7 billion kilowatt hours
(kWh) of electricity annually. See American Wind Energy Association (updated information
on installed U.S. wind power capacity and current operational projects), available at http://
www.awea.org.
56 M.J. Grubb & N.I. Meyer, Wind Energy: Resources, Systems and Regional Strategies,
in RENEWABLE ENERGY: SOURCES FOR FUELS AND ELECTRICITY 157, 189 (T. B. Johansson et
al. eds., 1993).
57 See NAT'L WIND COORDINATING COMM. (NWCC) SITING SUBCOMMITTEE, PERMIT-
TING OF WIND ENERGY FACILmES: A HANDBOOK (rev. Aug. 2002) [hereinafter NWCC SITING
SUBCOMM.].
58 Id.
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although in some cases a state agency's decisions preempt local jurisdic-
tion. At the state level, the environmental or natural resource agency
usually takes the lead in a project review, with additional input from the
state energy office, utility commissions, and state historic preservation
offices. 59
In addition to state and local governments, the federal government
also has responsibilities for permitting and managing some land-based
wind power projects. As of 2002, the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) administered twenty-five wind energy right-of-way authoriza-
tions on some 5,000 acres of public lands it manages in California and
Wyoming, totaling 500 MW of installed capacity.60 In addition, power-
marketing agencies that operate under the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) are involved in either wind power development or the purchasing
of electricity from wind projects. For example, the Bonneville Power
Administration (BPA), which supplies most of the energy to the Pacific
Northwest, incorporates electricity from five different wind power
projects into its grid for marketing and distribution. 61
The BLM recently developed an interim wind energy policy "to en-
courage the development of wind energy in acceptable areas," noting the
renewed interest in the development of commercial wind energy projects
on federal lands and the potential for wind power development on west-
ern federal lands.62 Although it only applies to land-based projects on
BLM lands, the policy offers the most comprehensive plan for authoriz-
ing wind energy projects on federal lands to date. The policy utilizes
both land use plans, which could include an assessment of wind resource
potential, and environmental reviews of assessments and impact state-
ments to assess individual wind project proposals. A partnership has
been created between the BLM and the DOE's National Renewable En-
59 Id.
60 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT. (BLM), INTERIM WIND
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT POLICY, INSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM 2003-020 (October 16, 2002)
[hereinafter BLM], available at http://www.blm.gov/nhp/efoia/wo/fyO3/im2OO3-020.htm. The
interim policy by its own terms expires on September 30, 2004. Id. The Forest Service, which
administers the national forests, on the other hand, has yet to authorize any development plan
for wind energy facilities on its lands. Associated Press, Forest Service Turns Down Land
Swap for Wind Project, CAPE COD TIMES (March 8, 2004) (discussing Green Mountain Na-
tional Forest Supervisor Paul Brewster's recent decision to turn down a request to swap 200-
300 acres of the Green Mountain National Forest for 1,150 acres of land owned by enXco,
French-partner of the Green Mountain Power Company, in an effort to expand its current
Searsburg wind farm onto federal lands), available at http://www.capecodonline.comlspecial/
windfarm/windswap8.htm. However, no authorization does not spell the end of the project;
rather, it could still be developed on national forest lands after an environmental evaluation
under NEPA. Id.
61 See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION (BPA), WIND PROJECTS (January 13, 2004),
available at http://www.transmission.bpa.gov/PlanProj/Wind; Bisbee; supra note 33, at 374-
78.
62 BLM, supra note 60.
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ergy Laboratory in an effort to inventory wind resources on public lands
and to help guide land use planning efforts.
6 3
As its interim policy, the BLM has essentially created a three-stage
process of authorizing wind power projects through right-of-way grants
on public lands (see Table 2). Although federal right-of-way regulations
do provide authority to offer public lands under a competitive bidding
procedure, the BLM has decided to process applications on a first come,
first served basis in order to "encourage the access to public lands for
renewable energy resource assessments and development."
64
TABLE 2: BLM WIND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT POLICY
Authorizations Requirements/Provisions
Stage I Right-of-way grants • Environmental review, consistent with
for site specific wind NEPA
energy testing and • Limited 3 year grant term
monitoring facilities • Does not establish exclusive/preferential
rights to development
• Annual rental fee
Stage 2 Right-of-way grants • Environmental review, consistent with
for wind energy site NEPA Extendable 3-year grant term
testing and • Holder retains an interest in the project
monitoring facilities area, but has no right to develop
that encompass a site • Holder must submit an amended right-
testing and of-way application and Plan of
monitoring project Development for BLM review
area • Annual rental fee
• Discretionary reclamation bond, usually
not required
Stage 3 Right-of-way grants • Environmental review, consistent with
for commercial wind NEPA
energy development • Long-term grant, authorizing of all
wind-related facilities, with appropriate
stipulations
- Annual rental fee
- Annual production rent
* Discretionary reclamation bond, usually
required
In the first step, an initial site-specific right-of-way grant may be
authorized for small site-specific testing and monitoring facilities such as
meteorological towers and instrumentation facilities with a limited term
63 Id. As set forth in the BLM's policy, all wind energy and related facilities will be
applied for under Subchapter V of the Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA) and 43
C.F.R. § 2802. See id.
64 Id.
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of three years. The site-specific right-of-way grant does not establish any
exclusive or preferential rights for future wind development, it cannot be
extended or renewed, and the applicant is assessed an annual rental fee.65
After the initial site-specific right-of-way grant expires, the developer
may apply for a three-year site testing and monitoring project area right-
of-way grant, which, although not establishing any right to development,
does preclude other wind energy right-of-way applications from being
filed for the same area. During this second phase, the applicant must
submit an amended right-of-way application and a Plan of Development
to the BLM for review in order to retain interest in the project area. 66
Otherwise, the right-of-way grant terminates and the lands open for other
wind energy applications. The applicant also must pay an annual rental
fee based on the total public land acreage of the project area.67 At the
discretion of the authorizing officer, a bond also may be required to en-
sure proper reclamation of the area and to cover costs incurred by
BLM.68 Finally, to begin construction and operation, the developer must
apply for a right-of-way grant for commercial wind energy development.
The authorization includes turbine towers, access roads, electrical trans-
mission facilities, and other support facilities, and the terms of the grant
are generally between thirty and thirty-five years. 69 During this phase,
the developer must pay a three-year phased-in annual minimum rent of
$2,635 per megawatt of anticipated installed capacity (this is a BLM-
wide rate) and will be assessed annual production rent to the extent that
the developer's project exceeds the parameters (e.g., capacity or purchase
price of electricity generated) assumed in the BLM-wide rate.70 In addi-
tion, a reclamation bond is usually required to ensure proper decommis-
sioning and rehabilitation of the project site once commercial production
has terminated.7'
65 Id. Rental fees will be a minimum of $50 per year for each meteorological tower or
instrumentation facility. 43 C.F.R. § 2803.1-2(a) (1987).
66 43 C.F.R. § 2803.6-1 (1982).
67 See BLM, supra note 60. The rental fee is $1,000 per year or $1 per acre, whichever
is greater. 43 C.F.R. § 2803.1-2(a) (1987).
68 See BLM, supra note 60.
69 See id.
70 Id. The annual minimum rent is $2,365 per megawatt. Id. The actual rent owed is
based on the total anticipated installed capacity of the wind project as described in the Plan of
Development, the total number of hours in a year, a capacity factor of thirty percent, a royalty
of three percent, and an average purchase price of $0.03 per kilowatt hour. Id. The rent is
phased in over three years, in which developers must pay twenty-five percent of the total
minimum rental fee for the first year, fifty percent for the second year, and 100 percent the
third year and beyond. In addition, if commercial operations begin prior to the third year, the
developer must begin to pay 100 percent of the annual minimum rent. Id. The authorizing
officer determines the wind energy production rental fee when the right-of-way grant is issued.
Id. The fee is based upon comparative market surveys and appraisals. Id.
71 43 C.F.R. § 2803.1-2(a) (1987).
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IV. LESSONS FROM U.S. OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT
As new uses emerge for federal offshore waters, the government
must be ready to respond to environmental, jurisdictional, and economic
concerns, all while serving the public interest. Yet it remains to be seen
how the government will tackle these complex issues. With the glaring
lack of any comprehensive and consistent management framework, it is
clear that a new legal regime is needed to address new ocean uses such as
offshore wind power and aquaculture. However, examining already-ex-
isting successful ocean management regimes, such as the OCS oil and
gas program, may help guide innovations in future ocean governance.
For example, in its final report, the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy
recommends developing comprehensive management plans to guide the
planning and leasing process of emerging activities in federal waters,
noting, "the scope and comprehensiveness of the outer continental shelf
(OCS) oil and gas program can be a model for the management of a wide
variety of offshore activities." 72 The Commission also recommends leg-
islation to ensure that the public "receives a fair return from the
use. . .and development rights" of offshore lands, taking into account
"state, local, and public concerns." 73
Offshore oil and gas, to this point, has been the most sought after
resource of the United States' OCS. The history of the U.S. OCS oil
development program is quite extensive, spanning the last 100 years. 74
In fact, the earliest U.S. offshore oil drilling activities took place on piers
extending from the shore in Summerland, California, in 1896,75 and by
the end of 2002, U.S. offshore waters supplied more than twenty-five
percent of the country's natural gas production and more than thirty per-
cent of the total domestic oil production. 76 But control and jurisdiction
over such valuable resources have been controversial. On September 28,
1945, the Truman Proclamation claimed U.S. jurisdiction and control
over the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental
shelf, essentially beginning the modern movement of coastal jurisdic-
tional claims and Law of the Sea. Two years later, the U.S. Supreme
Court issued its seminal opinion in United States v. California,77 con-
firming the federal government's ownership of the submerged lands and
associated natural resources from the tidelands to three miles from
72 U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 7, at 307.
73 Id. at 320.
74 See generally C. Lester, Contemporary Federalism and New Regimes of Ocean Gov-
ernance: Lessons from the Case of Outer Continental Shelf Oil Development, 23 OCEAN AND
COASTAL MGMT. 7 (1994).
75 Id.
76 See Offshore Minerals Management Home Page, available at http://www.mms.gov/
offshore (last visited Oct. 6, 2004).
77 See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
92 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
shore.78 In 1953, though, under the Eisenhower Administration, Con-
gress effectively reversed United States v. California. In passing the
Submerged Lands Act,79 Congress gave the states exclusive rights to re-
sources of the "marginal sea"-the band of water up to three nautical
miles from shore. 80
Some fundamental parallels exist among offshore oil production,
offshore wind power production, and offshore mariculture. Each process
likely gives rise to controversy involving the siting of structures with the
potential to cause negative environmental impacts on the surrounding
ocean ecosystem. Although NEPA review processes can be extensive,
there remains an air of scientific uncertainty regarding both immediate
and long-term effects, both beneficial 8' and harmful, 82 on the environ-
ment. In addition, the potential for navigational hazards exists anytime a
facility or structure is erected in the open ocean, whether it arises from an
oil and gas platform, a wind turbine support structure, or an aquaculture
net pen. On the other hand, because offshore wind power and offshore
aquaculture are currently more economically feasible closer to shore than
oil and gas, at present, coastal communities might be more susceptible to
visual impacts from wind farms and aquaculture facilities than they are
from oil platforms located further offshore.
Today, unlike wind power and aquaculture, a mature comprehensive
planning and management framework for leasing and production does
exist for offshore oil and gas. The OCSLA manages oil and gas resources
on the OCS.83 It states, "the outer Continental Shelf is a vital national
resource reserve held by the Federal Government for the public, which
should be made available for expeditious and orderly development.
... 84 The OCSLA requires the Secretary of the Department of the Inte-
rior (DOI) to prepare a five-year leasing program indicating the size,
timing, and location of leasing activity "which he determines will best
78 Id.
79 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1953).
80 Id. § 1311. The U.S. nevertheless retained the right to regulate, among other things,
commerce and navigation in these waters. See also id. § 1314 (1953). For historical reasons,
Texas and Florida on the Gulf coast each maintain jurisdiction out to nine nautical miles. See
id. § 1301.
81 Wind power, for example, could replace coal or oil burning electrical generating facil-
ities, thus reducing the number of premature deaths from air pollution. Kempton et al., supra
note 16.
82 Wind power also could have impacts on avian species and marine mammals. See,
e.g., U.S. FISH AND WLDLIFE SERVICE, Service Interim Guidance on Avoiding and Minimizing
Wildlife Impacts from Wind Turbines (May 13, 2003); see also S. Koschinski et al.,
Behavioural Reactions of Free-ranging Porpoises and Seals to the Noise of a Simulated 2 MW
Windpower Generator, 265 MAR. EcOL. PROG. SER. 263 (2003).
83 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et seq.
84 Id. § 1332 (1986).
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meet national energy needs"85 for each five-year period. The Mineral
Management Service (MMS) is the bureau within the DOI responsible
for implementing the program and fulfilling the requirements of the OC-
SLA. Currently, the MMS is operating under the 2002-2007 plan, which
sets forth eight proposed tract leases in the Alaska region and twelve
proposed tract leases in the Gulf of Mexico.8 6 Because of Congressional
action in the early 1980s and President George Herbert Walker Bush's
restrictions in 1990, some 610 million acres of OCS lands have been
removed from leasing considerations, effectively limiting access to the
OCS program to parts of the Gulf of Mexico and Alaska.87 In addition to
oil and gas, MMS is also responsible for other mineral production off-
shore, which currently includes gravel and sand.88
The current oil leasing plan process, shaped by past litigation and
judicial review, is much clearer, more concise, and more transparent than
in the past, and perhaps a similarly-structured, albeit more stream-lined,
leasing regime could be beneficial for offshore marine aquaculture
projects or wind power production. The OCSLA process can be divided
into five stages (see Table 3). Stage 1 involves the DOI and MMS prep-
TABLE 3. OCSLA PROCESS
Requirements
Stage 1 Leasing Plan - DOIIMMS prepares 5-year leasing
program
- Initial NEPA review of leasing program
- Governor's review for comments
Stage 2 Lease Sales • NEPA review for specific lease sites
- CZMA consistency determination by
Governors
- Notice of sale
Stage 3 Exploration by • Lessee prepares exploration plan for
Lessees review
- Secretary prepares environmental report
- Exploratory well drilling permit
- NPDES permit
Stage 4 Development and - Approval of development and production
Production plan
Stage 5 Termination • Decommissioning
85 Id. § 1344(a) (1978).
86 See MINERAL MANAGEMENT SERVICE (MMS), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
SCHEDULE OF LEASE SALE STEPS (effective July 1, 2002); MMS, NOTICE OF AVAILABILITY OF
THE FINAL NOTICE OF AVAILABILITY OF THE PROPOSED FINAL 5-YEAR OUTER CONTINENTAL
SHELF (OCS) OIL AND GAS LEASING PROGRAM, FOR 2002-2007, 67 Fed. Reg. 19,447 (April
19, 2002).
87 U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 7, at 289.
88 See MMS, SAND AND GRAVEL PROGRAM, available at http://www.mms.gov/sandand
gravel (last visited Oct. 6, 2004).
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aration of the five-year leasing program-a nine-month process involv-
ing draft proposals, multiple public comment periods, initial NEPA
review, and a mandatory sixty-day comment period in Congress.89 Once
the five-year program has been announced, Stage 2-planning for spe-
cific lease sales-may commence. This ten-month process involves an
additional NEPA review for specific lease sites, consistency determina-
tions by state governors, and notice of sale.90 Once a lease is issued, the
lessee still has no right to proceed with exploration or development, but
rather merely has priority in submitting plans to conduct further activi-
ties. Stage 3 involves the actual exploration by the lessees who must
prepare an exploration plan to be approved by the Secretary, in addition
to the Secretary's environmental report.91 If approved, the three-month
Coastal Zone Management consistency review begins. Meanwhile, the
lessee must obtain an exploratory well drilling permit 92 and perhaps a
National Point Discharge Elimination System93 (NPDES) permit if dis-
charge is likely. Stage 4 involves development and production and meet-
ing CZMA consistency. 94 Stage 5 terminates the lease process with the
decommission of the production and development platform,95 which is
particularly important to ensuring unrestricted navigability and the re-
moval of any remaining environmental hazards. It is certainly feasible
that any contract or management plan for offshore wind facilities or
aquaculture projects would require a similar comprehensive planning and
decommissioning process to protect environmental quality in coastal
waters.
A major consideration in siting aquaculture or an offshore wind
farm is protecting the public interest. With increasing demands for
"green" energy spurring the development of offshore wind power and
flat or falling capture fisheries doing the same for offshore aquaculture, it
will become crucial for the government to protect the land it holds in
trust for the public. As with offshore oil and gas production, one way the
trustees of the lands and waters-the federal and state governments-
might ensure that the public benefits from aquaculture or offshore wind
projects is to charge lease and royalty fees. For example, the OCSLA
authorizes the Secretary to grant oil and gas leases on submerged lands
89 See MMS, THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LEASING PROCESS, available at http:I/
www.mms.gov/ld/PDFs/Leasing%20process%20for%20web.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2004).
90 Id.
91 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(1) (1985).
92 Id. § 1340(d) (1985).
93 See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE
ELIMINATION SYSTEM (NPDES), available at http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/ (last visited Feb. 9,
2004).
94 43 U.S.C. § 1351 (1978).
95 See 30 C.F.R. §§ 250.1700 et seq.
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of the OCS to the highest competitive bidder.96 It is the role of the DOI
and the MMS to ensure that the federal government receives fair market
value for such lands leased. In addition to revenue from lease sales (bo-
nus bids) and annual rents, the MMS collects royalties on production.
The Federal Government may redeem such royalties in cash or in royal-
ties-in-kind (a volume of the commodity). 97 Between 1953 and 2002,
total federal revenues from offshore oil and gas leasing and production
reached approximately $145 billion;98 in fiscal year 2002, the OCS pro-
gram generated approximately $5 billion in bonuses, rents, and royal-
ties.99 The Secretary also can negotiate leases for resources other than
oil, gas, and sulfur, such as sand, gravel, and shell resources, on a com-
petitive basis to the highest bidder. 1°° In addition, the Secretary may
assess a fee to the lessee based upon the value of the resource and the
public interest served. 101 However, when a federal, state, or local gov-
ernment agency uses such resources for shore protection, beach restora-
tion, or coastal wetlands restoration, the MMS can negotiate on a non-
competitive basis. 102
Under Section 8(g) of the 1985 amendments to the OCSLA, the
federal government shares revenues with adjacent coastal states in those
instances when an oil and gas facility is located within three miles of a
state's jurisdictional waters (commonly referred to as the "8g zone"), and
that state receives twenty-seven percent of all revenues from production.
Seaward of the 8g zone, the federal government retains 100% of the roy-
alties. 10 3 In 1998, thirty-five states received a total of more than $559
million from these 8g tracts." °4 Lessons learned from state and federal
equity conflicts over oil and gas royalty revenues should help guide any
future management plan for aquaculture or offshore wind power devel-
opment. We discuss this issue in more detail in Section VI.
96 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1) (2000).
97 Id. § 1353 (a)(1) (2000).
98 U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 6, at 292.
99 MMS, FACTS AND FIGURES (2003). A small portion of this amount would have been
disbursed to the States pursuant to 43 U.S.C § 1337(g). See supra notes 96-97 and accompa-
nying text.
100 See 43 U.S.C. § 1337(k)(1); 30 C.F.R. § 281.18.
101 43 U.S.C. § 1337(k)(2)(B) (1999).
102 Id.
103 Id. § 1337(g).
104 MMS, 35 STATES RECEIVE $559 MILLION IN 1998 AS SHARE OF FEDERAL MINERAL
REVENUES (Feb. 22, 1999) (MMS News Release), available at http://www.mms.gov/ooc/press/
1999/99011 .htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2004).
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V. LESSONS LEARNED FROM OTHER COUNTRIES'
MANAGEMENT OF OFFSHORE WIND
AND AQUACULTURE
A. OFFSHORE WIND POWER IN EUROPE
The European Union's (E.U.'s) first offshore wind farm began oper-
ation in Denmark in 1991. As of mid-2003, 11 offshore wind power
projects totaling 279 megawatts had been implemented in the E.U. in
Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Projects
are planned in Belgium, France, Germany, and Ireland.10 5
Although offshore wind power projects have operated in the E.U.
for over a decade, regulations governing the development of projects are
in varying stages. For example, according to a 2002 study by the Euro-
pean Wind Energy Association (EWEA) which examined offshore wind
power project regulation in eight E.U. member nations, development of
offshore wind projects in all countries studied requires input from at least
seven different agencies.10 6 Within several E.U. member nations, differ-
ent regulations apply depending on the location of a proposed project,
that is, whether the project would be located within a country's territorial
sea (within 12 nautical miles of shore) or its EEZ. t0 7 Often, as in Ger-
many, provincial law will apply in the territorial sea, while national law
will apply in the EEZ. The E.U.'s regulatory scheme thus is somewhat
analogous to the United States' federal scheme for offshore waters. 10 8
This confusing regulatory structure has been identified as a major factor
limiting European development of offshore wind energy. 10 9 Those na-
tions, such as France, that have not developed an explicit planning and
permitting process for offshore wind projects tend to have the most com-
plex and confusing combinations of regulatory authorities.
Additionally, requirements for environmental impact assessments
(EIA) for offshore wind projects vary from nation to nation within the
E.U. Council Directive 97/1 1/EC obliges E.U. Member States to per-
form an EIA for certain projects. 110 This Directive is transposed into
105 L.W. M. BEURSKENS & M. DE NooRD, OFFSHORE WIND POWER DEVELOPMENTS: AN
OVERVIEW OF REALIZATIONS AND PLANNED PROJECTS 6-7 (Energy Research Centre of the
Netherlands, ECN-C-03-058 (2003).
106 S. SHAW ET AL., ENABLING OFFSHORE WIND DEVELOPMENTS 102 (3E and European
Wind Energy Association, 2003).
107 See supra note 2.
108 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
109 GARRAD HASSAN & PARTNERS ET AL., OFFSHORE WIND ENERGY: READY TO POWER A
SUSTAINABLE EUROPE, FINAL REPORT, CONCERTED ACTION ON OFFSHORE WIND ENERGY IN
EUROPE 7-24 (Delft University of Technology, NNE5-1999-562, Dec. 2001).
110 Council Directive 97/11/EC of 3 March 1997, Assessment of the Effects of Certain
Public and Private Projects on the Environment (amending Council Directive 85/337/EEC of
27 June 1985), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm./environment/eia/full-legal-text/
971 1.htm.
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each nation's federal law by individual legislation. Directive 97/1 1/EC
includes "installations for the harnessing of wind power for energy pro-
duction (wind farms)" as projects that may or may not be subject to EIA,
and does not distinguish between onshore and offshore wind energy
projects."'I Member States are to either review applications for wind
farms on a case-by-case basis or set thresholds for wind farm projects
that would be subject to EIA. Consequently, each E.U. Member State
utilizes different criteria, generally stated in the codifying legislation, to
determine whether a wind farm project is subject to an EIA. For exam-
ple, some nations, such as Germany, specifically require EIA for off-
shore wind projects, while other nations simply require that any wind
farm larger than a certain number of turbines or generating capacity falls
under the provisions of an EIA. Table 4 shows examples of EIA criteria
for wind farms in different nations.
B. BEST PRACTICES
The European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) study identified
several best practices to enable development of offshore wind energy
policy. In particular, the study recommends utilizing a "one-stop shop"
for leasing, permitting, and environmental assessment to streamline the
approval process for offshore wind energy development. Denmark has
implemented such a scheme, with the Danish Energy Authority exercis-
ing jurisdiction over all offshore wind projects. A second best manage-
ment practice would ensure that financial requirements for application
and permitting are clear to project developers. Clarity is important be-
cause fee schedules for offshore energy project applications vary by
country, with some countries requiring high application fees whereas
others do not ask for payment until the time of leasing the project. Fee
schedules vary greatly among nations, as shown in Table 4. Although
most nations have public involvement requirements through their EIA
laws, enhanced communication and public involvement beyond mini-
mum EIA standards would better enable offshore wind power develop-
ments. Finally, nations should enact clauses that oblige the developer to
be financially responsible for decommissioning wind turbines"
2
C. DIFFERENCES IN THE E.U. AND U.S. WITH RESPECT TO OFFSHORE
WIND FARms
Differences in the prevalence of offshore wind energy production
between the E.U. and the United States can be attributed to several fac-
S11 Council Directive 97/ 1/EC of 3 March 1997, Assessment of the Effects of Certain
Public and Private Projects on the Environment, amending Council Directive 85/337/EEC O.J.
(L 073), 5-15.
112 SHAW ET AL., supra note 106, at 103-08.
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tors. First, the E.U. has made a strong commitment to the development
of renewable energy sources. Whereas the United States has declared a
need to reduce dependency on foreign fossil fuel imports, the federal
government has yet to take the actions necessary to achieve this goal.
The United States also has yet to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, which would
require reductions in fossil fuel consumption through international law.
Finally, the governments of E.U. member nations have made strong and
specific commitments to offshore wind power. Denmark, for instance,
which currently leads the globe in offshore wind production, is imple-
menting its Energy 21 Plan that sets a target of 5,500 megawatts of in-
stalled wind capacity, of which 4,000 megawatts is to be generated
offshore. 1 1 3
Even in the event that the U.S. does adopt an aggressive and com-
prehensive offshore wind power program and dedicates significant finan-
cial and personnel resources to making offshore wind a reality, offshore
wind may have to face additional burdens that have not yet presented
themselves to the E.U. Indeed, areas of high wind energy potential in the
U.S. and the E.U. experience different user conflicts, and it is possible
that the user conflicts present in the E.U. have proven easier to resolve
than they would be in the U.S. The locations of existing and planned
offshore wind projects in the E.U. tend to be geographically separate
from areas of high coastal tourist use. Resort areas-in particular the
Mediterranean Sea-have generally not been targeted for offshore wind
development. Furthermore, those areas that have been targeted in the
North Sea and Baltic Sea do not share the same characteristics as pro-
posed offshore wind projects in the United States such as Cape Cod, with
high recreational use, expensive vacation homes, and high levels of
113 Development of Offshore Wind Power in Denmark (2002), available at http://green
nature.com/article 1 040.html.
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tourism. Areas in which wind farms have been proposed in the E.U. tend
to experience high commercial shipping volumes.' 15
D. REGULATION OF OFFSHORE AQUACULTURE PROJECTS OVERSEAS
As with offshore wind power, development of offshore aquaculture
projects has proceeded more quickly outside of the United States, partic-
ularly in Japan, Norway, Ireland, the United Kingdom (Scotland), Chile,
New Zealand, and Australia. Moreover, other nations are likewise grap-
pling with fitting new offshore uses into existing complex legal regimes.
Overwhelmingly, most other nations have developed legislation for
aquaculture under national fisheries acts, implemented either by an
agency analogous to a ministry of fisheries or an oceans agency. For the
most part, these nations require both a lease for an area of ocean and a
license to operate an aquaculture facility. Discussed below are the regu-
latory frameworks for Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, and Chile. Table 5
provides a comparison of each nation's policies.' 
16
The Ireland Department of the Marine is a comprehensive oceans
agency that regulates its aquaculture industry. In addition to aquaculture,
it regulates commercial shipping, fisheries, forestry, port services, miner-
als and hydrocarbons exploration, marine coastal zone management,
marine tourism, emergency response, research, and technology develop-
ment. Within the Department of the Marine, the Inland Fisheries/
Aquaculture Policy Division leases development space on the foreshore
(sea bed) and issues licenses for the aquaculture industry under the 1959-
1997 Fisheries Acts. Ireland, recognizing the important economic im-
pact of marine aquaculture, has initiated a US$37 million plan to survey
and map the entire EEZ to help determine the best use of offshore and
coastal resources for potentially conflicting purposes, including aquacul-
ture, fisheries, and oil and gas exploration. 1
17
Chile's General Law of Fisheries and Aquaculture of 1991 regulates
leases and licenses for aquaculture. A lease is required for the use of a
certain area of the coastal waters for aquaculture purposes. An applicant
who has received a lease must obtain a license to develop an aquaculture
facility. In order to reduce conflicts between aquaculture and other
coastal and marine uses, a process was developed for siting aquaculture
facilities. Each region set up a commission that determined areas suita-
ble for aquaculture. With insights gained from stakeholder input, the
115 Buck, supra note 19.
116 See generally B. CICIN-SAIN ET AL., DEVELOPMENT OF A POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR
OFFSHORE MARINE AQUACULTURE IN THE 3-200 MILE U.S. OCEAN ZONE (Center for the Study
of Marine Policy, 2000), available at http://darc.cms.udel.edu/sgeez/sgeezl .html.
117 Id. at 114-15.
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Ministry of Defense then finalized the process with Executive Decrees
for at least six of Chile's nine regions.1 18
Japan's national Law of Fisheries sets fishing and aquaculture pol-
icy at the national level. However, administration of the regulatory
framework for aquaculture is carried out at the prefecture (local/regional)
level. Under the Law of Fisheries, organized groups of fishers may ap-
ply for an "aquaculture right," which grants its holder exclusive use of a
certain ocean area for aquaculture. Applications must include informa-
tion on the type of facility to be constructed, the precise area involved,
and which species are involved. The Prefecture Governor, on the advice
of the Prefecture Fisheries Coordination Committee, grants aquaculture
rights, which are valid for five years. A fisher holding an aquaculture
right over a certain area can exclude other users from entering that
area. 119
New Zealand's aquaculture industry is regulated by the Ministry of
Fisheries, which implements regulations set forth under the Fisheries
Act. The Ministry of Fisheries is self-funding; that is, rather than receiv-
ing a budget from the government, it has in place a fee structure that
applies to all holders of leases, permits, or licenses. For aquaculture,
these fees are referred to as Aquaculture Levies and Transaction Charges
and are earmarked for the enforcement of aquaculture regulations and for
aquaculture research costs. The Ministry of Fisheries requires all
aquaculture facilities to have fishing permits for the removal of fish. Re-
gional and district councils issue leases and operating licenses for
aquaculture facilities. It does not seem that New Zealand requires EIA
for aquaculture facilities; however, "cultural, economic, and social and
environmental factors are considered in the granting of a marine farming
lease or license.' 120
118 Id. at 118-21.
119 Id. at 127-29.
120 Id. at 124-37.
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VI. FRAMEWORK FOR SUSTAINABLE USE, CONSERVATION,
AND MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL
OFFSHORE WATERS
Drawing on the land and sea experiences in the U.S. and offshore
development in other parts of the world, we make five recommendations
for improvements in the use, conservation, and management of federal
offshore waters: (1) Conveyance of property rights; (2) Protection of and
fair compensation for the use of public resources; (3) Compensation for
local impacts and (4) Facility closure; and (5) Administration, planning,
and management.
A. LEASING, RIGHT-OF-WAYS, OR OTHER CONVEYANCE OF RIGHTS
AND SECURITY OF TENURE
The ability of an aquaculture or wind business venture to success-
fully navigate federal offshore waters will depend in part on the degree to
which the entrepreneur behind that venture is able to exercise control
over the site of operations. Typically, on land, control would be mani-
fested through ownership, a lease, or some other form of conveyance. A
glaring defect of the present regulatory regime for offshore uses is that
possession of an RHA permit regulates newly emerging uses. With the
RHA, no conveyance occurs and no property interest in the ocean space
at issue in the permit is vested in the permittee. A lease (or lease substi-
tute), on the other hand, would provide developers with a degree of ex-
clusivity and security sufficient to obtain the financing necessary to bring
a project to fruition.
B. PROTECTION OF AND FAIR COMPENSATION FOR THE USE OF
PUBLIC RESOURCES
While a lease would provide security of tenure to developers, it also
would "protect[ ] the public's interests in the resource by setting forth
detailed rights and responsibilities . . . including the obligation to pay
rent (and royalties, as appropriate) and to ensure proper closure of the
facility,"' 2 2 which we discuss in more detail below. In order to protect
the public interest, the lead agency would need to adopt lease application
regulations that specify the information (in conjunction with the results
of the environmental evaluation and public input) it needs to be able to
make an informed decision on the application. In addition to specifying
items such as duration, dimensions, and annual rent, leases should re-
quire developers to provide the federal government with access to the
facility to conduct monitoring, inspection, and enforcement activities and
to furnish copies of documents for the same purposes.
122 Firestone, supra note 32.
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Given that an offshore facility may generate significant revenues
during its finite life, it is neither prudent nor fiscally responsible for the
federal government to forego revenues that private individuals would
surely demand had the ocean bottom and ocean space been privately
held. Although some federal programs that allow the extraction of non-
renewable or renewable resources do not provide for public compensa-
tion (capture fisheries) 123 or only absurdly minimal compensation (hard
rock mining), 124 these programs are rooted in eras that no longer exist.
The Mining Law dates back to 1872,125 and capture fisheries policy was
based on the obsolete notion of the freedom of any fisher to fish in al-
most the entire ocean expanse and the antiquated belief that humans
could not fish out the seas.' 2 6 More appropriate examples are offshore
oil and gas leasing, land-based mineral leasing on federal lands, 127 tim-
ber harvesting in national forests, 128 and grazing on federal lands,' 29 all
of which require the lessee or permittee, as appropriate, to provide some
compensation to the federal government.
More importantly, as a first principle, requiring a fee to occupy
ocean space and to make use of related resources (and consequently to
impair or prevent the use of these resources for other purposes) is consis-
tent with the notion that the federal government holds ocean space and
related resources in trust for its citizens. 130 Further, to forgo rents and
royalties for the use of ocean space would result in an unintended policy
of subsidizing offshore wind power to a greater extent than is done for
land-based wind power placed on private lands and would, as a conse-
quence, unduly favor ocean-based over land-based development. We
123 See John A. Duff, Offshore Management Considerations: Law and Policy Questions
Related to Fish, Oil, and Wind, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 385, 388-91 (2004).
124 CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE
FUTURE OF THE WEST 30 (1992) (stating that the mining industry reaps billions annually while
paying the federal government no royalties and $5 or less per acre to mine hard rock minerals
located on federal lands).
125 30 U.S.C. §§ 22 et seq.
126 See, e.g., HuGO GRoTrus, MARE LIBERUM (1609).
127 See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 226 (2000); Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of
1982, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1757 (2000); see also 30 U.S.C. § 360 (2000); Geothermal Steam
Act of 1970, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1025 (2000).
128 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 472a (2000).
129 See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1752 (2000). See generally WILKINSON, supra note 124,
at 81 (indicating that grazing fees on public lands are considerably lower than that charged by
private landowners).
130 DAVID C. SLADE ET AL., PUTrING THE PUBLIC TRUST DoCTRINE TO WORK (Coastal
States Org. 2d ed. 1997); Peter H. Sand, Sovereignty Bounded: Public Trusteeship for Com-
mon Pool Resources?, 4.1 GLOBAL ENVTL. POLITICS 47 (2004); Charles F. Wilkinson, The
Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 269 (1980). Article 56 of
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea further protects the sovereign rights of
coastal states for purposes of economic exploitation, research, and preservation. See United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (hereinafter
UNCLOS).
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thus recommend that annual rents be paid by offshore developers to com-
pensate the public for the use of ocean space and that royalties in the
form of a percentage of the revenue generated from the activities of such
developers be paid to the government in an amount equivalent to the fair
market value of interest in the ocean space conveyed.
However, for newly emerging activities, the government may wish
to accept a smaller percentage for a period of time-for example, five to
ten years from the enactment of legislation-that could vary depending
on the activity. In the alternative, the government could choose to re-
invest revenues during this initial time period in research that would fa-
cilitate sustainable uses of federal offshore waters. Finally, given that
management of federal offshore waters may change during the life of
some projects, we also recommend that any permit issued by the Army
Corps of Engineers in the interim have a provision requiring that the
permit be reopened in the event that Congress passes legislation estab-
lishing a property rights regime for new federal offshore uses. The legis-
lation as well should itself direct that existing permits be reopened to
require the permittee to enter into such a property rights arrangement
with the United States and to pay the government rent and royalties
equivalent to the fair market value of the lease.
C. SHARING ROYALTIES WITH STATES FOR SUBSTANTIAL LOCAL
IMPACTS
The local public is more likely to voice concern when a project is
expected to have local impacts and diffuse benefits. 131 Given this fact,
the federal government should consider sharing royalties with states or
local governments for any revenue-generating project proposed for fed-
eral offshore waters that is anticipated to have substantial local impacts.
The federal government also may wish to consider sharing revenues to
the extent that such action would facilitate appropriate, sustainable, and
environmentally sound development of federal offshore waters.
For example, Congress may wish to consider revenue sharing for an
offshore wind power project that a developer proposes to construct in
federal waters yet within view from the shore. Likewise, to the extent
that an aquaculture facility has ecological impacts on a capture fishery
that straddles federal and state jurisdictional waters, it also may wish to
consider state compensation. For ease of implementation, rather than
make case-by-case determinations, Congress may wish to follow its own
lead in the oil and gas context and share revenues when a project is
within three miles of a state's jurisdictional waters, or, alternatively, to
131 See Kempton et al., supra note 16.
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marry the obligation to share revenues with the present breadth of the
territorial sea (twelve miles from the coast).
D. DECOMMISSION, PERFORMANCE BONDING, AND CLOSURE
ASSURANCE
Even under regimes such as hydroelectric power licensing, where
authority to mandate closure funds is not explicit, 32 FERC has begun to
see the benefits of utilities maintaining such funds. In its opinion ap-
proving a settlement, In re Consumers Power Company,133 FERC di-
rected the utility to seek authority to collect dam retirement funding at
eleven dams from present ratepayers. As noted above, decommissioning
funding was likewise identified as a best practice in offshore wind power
development in the E.U.
From an economic standpoint, closure assurance funding for off-
shore wind power and aquaculture facilities makes sense because it re-
quires those benefiting from offshore wind power or aquaculture to pay
for the full costs of those activities, which include the costs of decom-
missioning facilities at the end of their useful lives. Moreover, the prin-
ciple of intergenerational equity suggests that a future generation should
not be saddled with the costs of decommissioning a facility that benefited
the present generation. In addition, the notion of performance bonding
and closing assurance is consistent with fiduciary responsibilities of the
federal government with regard to the ocean.
For the reasons mentioned above, we believe that any regulatory
scheme for offshore development, including wind power and marine
aquaculture, should provide for detailed provisions on site closure, per-
formance bonding, and closure funding. A performance-bonding re-
quirement also will help to ensure that, if the operations of an offshore
facility cause, contribute to, or result in damages to an ecosystem or a
part thereof, the operator will have funds on hand to pay for remediation
and restoration of the environment, or, in those instances when remedia-
tion and restoration are not feasible, to compensate the public by reim-
bursing it for the damages incurred.
E. CONSOLIDATION OF OCEAN FUNCTIONS AND ENHANCED
ADMINISTRATION, PLANNING, AND MANAGEMENT
In its Final Report, the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy recom-
mends streamlining the process for licensing, leasing, and permitting of
132 See 18 C.F.R. § 6.2 (2004) (noting that licensees are required, in any event, to restore
the lands to a condition satisfactory to the Department having supervision over such lands
upon surrendering of the licenses).
133 68 FERC 61,077 (1994).
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renewable energy facilities in U.S. waters.' 34 Although land-based wind
and near-shore aquaculture projects have been successful, to date there
has yet to be any successful wind or aquaculture project in federal off-
shore waters.
Better planning and management should begin by having the pro-
cess led by a resource agency rather than an agency whose prime concern
is navigation. An argument could be made for Congress to designate as
the lead agency for offshore aquaculture or wind power either the MMS,
given its experience in oil and gas planning and leasing,1 35 or the NOAA,
given its broader resource management focus and experience in commer-
cial fishing regulation. Indeed, having one of these two agencies as the
lead for emerging offshore activities may be the only feasible approach
in the short-term, given political realities. Nevertheless, we advocate a
more radical ecosystem-based approach. At the same time, it should be
recognized that our other recommendations for a framework (planning
and management of federal offshore waters, leasing, rents, royalties, and
closure assurance) are not dependent on the re-organization advocated
below and should be undertaken in any event.
In our view, rather than having two masters of the sea-the NOAA
and the MMS-and several sub-masters, federal offshore waters should
be managed by a single entity. Just as private property has the same
owner regardless of whether the owner is approached with a plan to de-
velop and lease the property for residential, commercial, or industrial
purposes or to place a conservation easement on the property to ensure
its maintenance in its natural condition, only one entity should decide
whether a given area of the ocean should be protected from certain activ-
ities or whether a specific activity in ocean space, be that activity oil and
gas development, sand and gravel mining, aquaculture, or offshore wind
farming, ought to be permitted, and if so, under what conditions.
To meet the objective of better planning and management, Congress
should consolidate the MMS and the NOAA either into an agency within
134 U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 7, at 320.
135 See generally, S. 2095, 108th Cong. § 321 (2004) (illustrating that legislation has been
introduced that would vest authority in the MMS to grant leases, easements, and rights-of-way
for the development of wind power and other energy sources and for marine-related purposes,
presumably including aquaculture at existing offshore energy facilities). For the most part,
Section 321 vests a great deal of discretion in the hands of the Secretary of the Interior on how
to structure the program. While the provision requires the Secretary to establish "reasonable"
payments, the bill would prohibit the establishment of payments based on "throughput or pro-
duction." Id. The provision would provide the Secretary with discretion (subject to specified
criteria) to determine whether to enter into a competitive or noncompetitive agreement. Id.
Finally, it would require the developer to furnish a surety bond or other form of acceptable
security. Given differences between the House and the Senate on certain aspects of the Omni-
bus Energy bills, there is considerable doubt as to whether this provision will become law
during the 108th Congress. For other proposed bills, see Utzinger, supra note 17, at 10805-
10807.
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an existing cabinet department or into a new cabinet-level department-
the Department of Oceans. In addition, Congress should consider incor-
porating some functions of other agencies, such as EPA's national estu-
ary program, the Army Corps of Engineers' Rivers and Harbor Act
jurisdiction over federal and state oceanic waters, 136 and the Coast
Guard's ballast water control program, spill response, and environmental
and natural resource enforcement capabilities 137 into this new entity. On
the other hand, some functions presently administered by the NOAA
should be transferred elsewhere. First and foremost, the management of
marine mammals and marine endangered species, which is presently
shared, between the NOAA/NMFS and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice (USFWS) should be consolidated in the USFWS. t38 Consolidation
would result in a more coherent ocean species preservation program and
would allow the new ocean entity to concentrate on ocean management
loosened from the grip of the conflict of interest between resource use
(e.g., commercial fisheries management) and the protection of marine
flora and fauna.1 39 Ultimately, the model for this new entity would be
federal land management agencies with multiple use mandates such as
the Forest Service and the BLM. 140
Whether or not a new agency is created, Congress should pass legis-
lation setting forth in more detail how the oceans are to be administered,
136 Under the proposal discussed herein, the Army Corps of Engineers would retain its
RHA jurisdiction in other U.S. waters.
137 This would require separating out the Coast Guard's border patrol and port security
activities, which would remain with the Department of Homeland Security.
138 The U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy recommends that the President and Congress
consolidate ocean management in a similar fashion to that advocated here. U.S. Comm'N ON
OCEAN POLICY, supra note 7, at 77 (recommending that the President and Congress consoli-
date similar functions among the federal ocean, coastal, and atmospherics programs). Yet, one
area where we differ from USCOP is with regards to where the authority over marine mam-
mals should reside. USCOP recommends that jurisdiction be placed in the hands of the
NOAA, while we, as indicated in the text, advocate USFWS jurisdiction to minimize conflicts
of interest in the protection of marine mammals and marine endangered species. Cf. id. at 267
(recommending that jurisdiction over marine mammals be placed in the hands of the NOAA).
We note that the USFWS has a similar role in species conservation in analogous land manage-
ment systems administered by the Forest Service and the BLM.
139 A second program that should be transferred from this new entity is the NOAA's
coastal non-point source pollution program, which should be transferred to EPA and merged
with EPA's non-point source program under the CWA.
140 While the Forest Service emphasizes logging and the BLM emphasizes mining and
grazing, both agencies approach management on a multiple use basis. E.g., 16. U.S.C. §§ 475-
482 (2000) (setting general administrative guidelines); National Forest Management Act of
1976 [hereinafter NFMA], 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (2000) (setting forest land management
planning guidelines); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 [hereinafter FLPMA],
43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (setting public land management planning guidelines). See also 16
U.S.C. § 1604 (2000) (requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to develop "land and resource
management plans" for the national forests); 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (2000) (requiring the Secretary
of the Interior to develop "land use plans" for the public lands).
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specifying a research agenda for the oceans, and prioritizing where and
how federal dollars should be spent. 14' In addition, Congress should
pass legislation to guide the comprehensive planning and management of
federal offshore waters, to delimit agency responsibilities for the govern-
ance of emerging uses such as offshore wind power and offshore
aquaculture, and to clarify and confirm that NEPA applies to activities in
the EEZ. The use, conservation, and management of offshore waters in
turn should be driven by the norms of sustainability, ecosystem manage-
ment, precaution, fair return to the public, minimization of environmental
impacts, transparency in decision-making, 142 and equity among users and
uses. 143
Planning and management would allow for improved site selection
and adequate consideration of cumulative impacts. For example, while
initially wind power site selection might be developer driven, given both
the developer's proposals already underway and the lack of adequate
public mapping of potential sites, site selection should move toward fed-
eral planning based on wind mapping of federal offshore waters and
other considerations to marine zoning.' 44 A similar graduated effort
could evolve for aquaculture. Developing a regional planning regime
along the lines employed for offshore oil and gas development also
would allow for better consideration of cumulative impacts of the dis-
charge of environmental effluents from aquaculture facilities and of the
placement and operations of wind farms on the migration, feeding, and
141 It is important to recognize that, to this day, the NOAA operates under a 1970 Admin-
istrative plan that reorganized government functions, but Congress has yet to spell out the
NOAA's mission and administration in legislation as it has for other agencies, such as the
Forest Service. Compare U.S. COMM. ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 7, at 73-75, with 16
U.S.C. §§ 475-482 (2000); see also United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S 696, 713-720
(1978) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 475, that Congress should reserve national forests in order to im-
prove and protect said forests, to secure favorable timber flows, and to furnish a continuous
supply of timber); id. at 720 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 528, that Congress' secondary purposes in
reserving national forests include outdoor recreation, range, watershed, and fish and wildlife).
142 The NWCC notes that the "public has a right to have its interests considered in the
permitting decisions, and without early and meaningful public involvement there is a much
greater likelihood of subsequent opposition and costly and time-consuming administrative re-
view and judicial appeals." NWCC SrrING SuBiCOMM., supra note 57, at 15 ("The public has a
right to have its interests considered in permitting decisions, and without early and meaningful
public involvement there is a much greater likelihood of subsequent opposition and costly and
time-consuming administrative reviews and judicial appeals."). See e.g., Kempton et al., supra
note 16 (reflecting findings supporting this conception of the public role).
143 NWCC SITING SUBCOMM., supra note 57, at 16 (recommending the development of
clear decision criteria to ensure the permitting process is both fair and efficient).
144 Some agencies involved in permitting wind facilities on land have actually begun to
zone land for wind development by identifying preferred siting areas for wind projects prior to
receiving permit applications, so development of the initial wind projects would be guided
toward the least environmentally sensitive lands and ensure the protection of environmentally
sensitive areas. Id. at 17. See also Santora et al., supra note 52.
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breeding activities of marine mammals and allow for proper siting, siz-
ing, and spacing of activities in federal offshore waters.
Legislation establishing planning and management should be in-
tegrative on the one hand, but also should include more specific provi-
sions that take into account the peculiarities of existing uses and
management challenges such as offshore oil and gas, commercial fishing,
and marine mammal protection as well as each new and emerging use
such as open-ocean aquaculture, offshore wind, tidal power, and wave
power. Following the example of the countries that we surveyed, Con-
gress should establish leasing or right-of-way grant authority for new
activities in federal offshore waters, which would govern matters such as
dimensions, duration, compensation, monitoring, access and termination,
and permitting, which would concern the precise activity at issue.
145
Finally, following the best practices established in the E.U. for off-
shore wind power development, the new U.S. offshore waters regime
should provide one-stop regulation, which would allow a developer to
file all the necessary documents with the lead federal agency, which
would then be responsible for coordinating with other necessary federal
and state agencies. By making one agency responsible for coordinating
the permit review process by all other agencies, delay will be minimized,
saving both the developers and the reviewing agencies significant ex-
penses that they would otherwise incur.146
CONCLUSION
With the recent policy attention the oceans have garnered in the past
year due to the release of reports by the U.S. Commission on Ocean
Policy and the Pew Oceans Commission, a policy window has opened.
In order to fulfill the promise of offshore development, ensure that re-
sponsible development proceeds rather than being unnecessarily side-
tracked, and protect the marine environment, it is imperative that
Congress devise an offshore regulatory regime that provides for the sus-
tainable use, conservation, protection, and management of the marine en-
vironment in a transparent and equitable fashion. It should do so before
development proceeds much further, so as to put that regime into place
while the window remains open.
145 Again, this could form the basis for regulation of offshore aquaculture and offshore
wind power should a broader restructuring not be undertaken as advocated here.
146 NWCC SITING SUBCOMM., supra note 57, at 16-17.

